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Non-Technical Summary
Monetary policy shocks are transmitted to the real economy through
different channels, which are collectively known as the monetary
transmission mechanism. The knowledge of this mechanism is im-
portant for monetary policy, since unawareness of the ways in which
monetary shocks are transmitted to the real sector might lead to dis-
tortions and higher volatility of interest rates and inflation. After
the accession of ten Central and Eastern European countries to the
European Union (EU) in May 2004, the analysis of the channels of
transmission is particularly relevant for the European Central Bank,
which will be responsible for the monetary policy in a future enlarged
European Monetary Union (EMU). The research so far has however
mostly concentrated on the analysis of the transmission mechanism
in the current member countries of the EMU, whereas the analysis
of the channels of transmission in the new member states of the EU
has lagged behind.
The intention of this paper is to fill this gap and to analyze the exis-
tence of a bank lending channel of monetary transmission in Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania for the period between 1997 and 2004. This
channel emphasizes the role of banks and informational frictions in
the transmission of monetary shocks. Due to these frictions banks
face a liquidity constraint and have to reduce loan supply in response
to a restrictive monetary policy shock. To identify the bank lending
channel in the Baltics, the panel structural approach by Kashyap
and Stein (1995) is used. This approach proxies informational fric-
tions by the size, the liquidity and the capitalization of banks. The
idea behind this approach is that smaller, less liquid and poorly cap-
italized banks face greater informational frictions and therefore react
more strongly to a restrictive monetary impulse. The estimations in-
dicate that distributional monetary policy effects are mainly caused
by differences in liquidity, whereas bank size does not significantly
influence the lending behavior of banks. The results also show that
the lending behavior does not depend on the domestic, but on the
euro money market rate due to the foreign exchange regime and the
use of internal capital markets.
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Abstract
Abstract: The paper empirically investigates the monetary trans-
mission mechanism in the Baltic States. The analysis of the trans-
mission channels through which monetary policy shocks are trans-
mitted is particularly important for the European Central Bank that
makes monetary policy in an enlarged European Monetary Union.
The paper focuses on the bank lending channel of monetary trans-
mission due to the importance of banks in the financial system of
the Baltic countries. The existence of this transmission channel is
tested by using a panel structural approach that distinguishes banks
according to size, capitalization, liquidity and ownership structure.
The results indicate that a bank lending channel is present in the
Baltic States and mainly caused by differences in liquidity.
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1 Introduction
Monetary policy shocks are transmitted to the real economy through
different channels, which are collectively known as the monetary
transmission mechanism. The knowledge of this mechanism is im-
portant for the conduct of monetary policy, since unawareness of the
ways in which monetary shocks are transmitted to the real sector
might lead to distortions and higher volatility of interest rates and
inflation.
The analysis of the channels of monetary transmission is therefore
an important part of the research work of a central bank. After
the accession of ten Central and Eastern European countries to the
European Union (EU) in May 2004, the analysis of the channels of
transmission is particularly relevant for the European Central Bank
(ECB), which will be responsible for the monetary policy in an en-
larged European Monetary Union (EMU). The research so far has
however mostly concentrated on the analysis of the transmission
mechanism in the current member states of the EMU, whereas the
analysis of the channels of transmission in the new member states of
the EU has lagged behind.
The objective of this paper is to fill this gap and to analyze the ex-
istence of the bank lending channel of monetary transmission in the
new member states of the EU by using balance sheet data for 36
banks for the period from 1997 to 2004. The study thereby focuses
on Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The number of empirical analy-
ses of the bank lending channel in these countries is limited to two
studies by Juks (2004) and Schmitz (2003). By using a structural
approach that distinguishes banks according to size, capitalization,
liquidity and ownership structure, the latter analyzes the existence of
a bank lending channel in eight central and eastern European Coun-
tries (including the three Baltic countries). Schmitz (2003) concludes
that banks react strongly to changes of the euro, but only weakly to
changes of the domestic money market rate. The author furthermore
finds only weak evidence that bank size and no evidence that bank
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capitalization and liquidity influence the lending behavior of banks.
Juks (2004) comes to a different conclusion for Estonia. His results
suggest that a bank lending channel is present in Estonia and mainly
driven by differences in capitalization and mostly by differences in
liquidity.
This paper extends these studies in three ways. First, it concen-
trate on a rather homogenous region due to the common history,
similar financial systems and almost identical exchange rate regimes.
This makes it possible to use a comprehensive dataset on bank bal-
ance sheets for panel data analysis without introducing potential
biases resulting from different financial systems and exchange rate
regimes. Secondly, the study extends the existing studies by further
years and focuses on a period that was relatively stable in terms of
the macroeconomic environment and monetary policy. Thirdly, the
paper puts particular attention on the distinctive features that influ-
ence the transmission of monetary policy shocks, namely the foreign
exchange rate regime, the dominance of foreign-owned banks and
the structural characteristics of banks and their interactions in the
Baltics.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Part 2 gives
a brief overview over the development of the financial system in the
Baltic countries and describes it by traditional indicators. Due to the
high importance of the bank loans for the financing of investments in
the Baltics, we elaborate on the theory of the bank lending channel
of monetary transmission in part 3. In part 4, we describe some
features of the Baltic countries that are relevant for the transmission
of monetary shocks, namely the foreign exchange rate regime, the
dominance of foreign-owned banks in the region and selected bank
characteristics like the size, the liquidity and the capitalization of
banks. After having laid the theoretical ground, we use a panel data
approach based on Kashyap and Stein (1995) in part 5 to test for
the existence of a bank lending channel in the Baltic countries. Part
6 concludes.
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2 Historical Overview
Since independence from the former Soviet Union in 1991 the Baltic
States have gone through a remarkable transformation. The whole
economy has been changed from a central-planned to a market-driven
system. The banking and financial sector have also been affected by
this development.
The development of the financial system in the Baltics started at the
end of 1991 and at the beginning of 1992 when the Baltic branches of
the central bank of the former Soviet Union were taken over by the
newly established central banks of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
The transformation of the monobank system into a modern two-
tier banking structure soon followed as these banks were split into
one central bank and the surviving commercial banks. These banks
were then transformed into independent joint-stock companies. Due
to low entry requirements and a lack of supervision in the Baltics,
the number of banks soon began to rise. This development was ac-
companied by the regain of monetary independence from the former
Soviet Union through the issuance of the Estonian Kroon in 1992,
the Latvian Lat in 1993 and the Lithuanian Litas in 1994. Estonia
and Lithuania henceforth pegged their currency in a currency board
arrangement to the Deutsche Mark and the US dollar, respectively.
Latvia opted for a less rigid peg and chose the Special Drawing Rights
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as nominal anchor for the
Lat.
The years from 1992 to 1996 were characterized by efforts to stabi-
lize the financial systems. The number of banks soon dropped due
to several mergers among banks and the first banking crisis. As a
result, new credit institution laws and modern accounting standards
were introduced in all three Baltic States. Estonia was again the first
nation which implemented new banking laws in 1995 and made Inter-
national Accounting Standards (IAS) obligatory for Estonian banks.
Latvia soon followed and raised the minimum capital requirements
to 10 percent in 1996. Lithuania enacted a partial deposit insurance
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law in 1996, before it implemented IAS for banks and higher capital
requirements in 1997 (Barisitz (2002)).
2.1 Recovery from the Russian Crisis and the
Accession to the EU
The Russian Crisis in 1998 led to massive withdrawals of capital by
international investors and a massive economic downturn, particu-
larly in Latvia (Adahl (2002)). Because of buoyant international
demand and large capital inflows a strong economic recovery how-
ever soon followed in all three Baltic States.
This created a favorable environment for the development of the fi-
nancial system in the Baltics. The Baltic banking sectors experienced
a second intensive consolidation phase during this period, which con-
tinued up until 2004. The result of this consolidation process is the
present banking structure. Several factors contributed to the wave of
consolidations in the banking sector of the Baltics: First of all, low
stock market prices of domestic banks during the crisis made Baltic
banks attractive for take-overs by foreign banks. Secondly, the priva-
tization of the last state-owned banks by the Estonian, Latvian and
Lithuanian authorities significantly accelerated the consolidation and
facilitated the entry of foreign banks in the domestic banking mar-
kets. Thirdly, the number of banks significantly decreased owing to
stricter regulation and supervision, which forced many non-profitable
banks to close business.
With the perspective of EU accession, the exchange rate policy was
an issue in the Baltics as well. Since Estonia has already pegged
its currency since 1999 to the euro, it did not have to change its
anchor currency to join the European Monetary System II in 2004.
Due to its dollar peg Lithuania switched to the euro in 2002. The
Bank of Latvia also decided to re-peg its currency to the euro in
2005. These factors have together with a parallel economic recovery
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led to increasingly similar developments in all three Baltic banking
markets.
2.2 The Structure of the Financial System in the
Baltics
The first indicator that is often used to measure the overall size of
financial intermediation is the ratio of M2 to GDP, which is also
called the degree of monetization. During the period from 1997 and
2004 the degree of monetization significantly increased in the Baltic
States (see Table 1). The comparison with the EU-15 however also
indicates that the level of intermediation and the size of the financial
system are still well below the EU-15.1
To assess the importance of banks and capital markets in the finan-
cial system of the Baltics, two indicators are used. The first indicator
is the ratio of total banking sector assets to GDP. This indicator is
a proxy for the size of the banking sector. The second indicator is
the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. This indicator mea-
sures the size of the stock market. Both indicators increased between
1997 and 2004 (except of the degree of stock market capitalization
in Lithuania). There is however still a large difference between the
banking sector development in the Baltic States and the EU. This
shows that the banking system in the three Baltic States is still in
development and rather shallow. The indicator for the size of the
banking sector is however significantly larger than the indicator for
the size of capital markets. This indicates that the financial system
in the Baltics is bank-based. The ratio of stock market capitaliza-
tion reaches sizeable values only in Estonia. Due to the low liquidity
of the market and the small number of listed shares it is however
questionable if stock markets can be used as an alternative source of
finance in Estonia.
1The EU-15 comprises the EU members before the enlargement in 2004, namely Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
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Table 1: Structure of the Baltic Financial System
Estonia Latvia Lithuania EU-15
1997 2004 1997 2004 1997 2004 1997 2004
M2 to GDP in
Percent
28.3 39.9* 26.6 35.7* 18.8** 31.5* 2283 2465
Total Assets as
Percent of GDP
63.0 94.4 49.0 101.3 25.0 47.5 419.0 416.4
Total Credit as
Percent of GDP
24.7 65.4 9.7 56.5 10.6 30.4 128.7 146.1
Market Capital-
ization as Per-
cent of GDP
8.8** 41.5* 6.1 9.6* 17.7 17.2* 70.8 91.0
Source: International Financial Statistics (2005), Allen, Bartillo, and
Kowalewski (2005) and EBRD (various issues). * Data from 2003, **
Data from 1998.
A widely used indicator that measures the importance of bank in-
termediation is the ratio of domestic credit provided by credit insti-
tutions divided by GDP. This ratio shows that bank lending is less
developed than in the EU, although the importance of credit finance
increased between 1997 and 2004. This can be explained by the sharp
economic downturn and several banking crises at the beginning of the
transformation, which led to massive bad-loan problems in the corpo-
rate sector. These problems forced banks to cut back loans. This is
also reflected in the data for 1997. During the recovering period the
credit volume increased again. Financial intermediation was however
still between 2 (Estonia) and 5 times lower (Lithuania) in the Baltics
than the average for the EU-15 in 2004.
2.3 The Structure of the Banking System in the
Baltics
The transformation and the Russian Crisis had had a significant in-
fluence on the banking structure in the Baltic States. After the ini-
tial explosion of the number of banks shortly after independence the
number of banks in Estonia and Latvia soon dropped and followed
the trend of consolidation that also reduced the average number of
banks in the EU-15 (see Table 2). The number of commercial banks
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increased between 1997 and 2004 only in Lithuania.
Table 2: Structure of the Baltic Banking System
Estonia Latvia Lithuania EU-15
1997 2004 1997 2004 1997 2004 1997 2004
Number
of Banks (of
which foreign-
owned)
12 (4) 7(4) 32 (5) 23 (10) 12 (4) 13 (7) 647 482
Share of For-
eign Bank As-
sets of total
Bank Assets
29.0 98.0 55.0 57.8 41.0 94.1 19.4 22.8
Herfindahl-
Hirschmann
Index (HHI)
4312 3887 1679 1021 3353 1854 712 931
Source: EBRD (various issues) and Allen, Bartillo, and Kowalewski
(2005).
Baltic States were fast in inviting foreign investors after the Russian
Crisis in 1998. This crisis led to a further consolidation of the bank-
ing market and the privatization of the last state-owned banks. As a
result of this restructuring process, foreign banks, which had already
been present in the Baltics, gained an even higher share of the local
market. This development is also reflected by the share of bank as-
sets that is held by non-residents, which is significantly higher in the
Baltics than the EU-15 average. Foreign-owned banks have reached
a dominant market position, particularly in Estonia and Lithuania.
The dominant position of foreign banks is also reflected in the high
market concentration of the Baltic banking markets. This can be
illustrated by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).2 Although the
degree of concentration of the banking markets decreased between
1997 and 2004, the HHI Index still exceeds the critical value of 1800
indicating that the banking sectors in the Baltics are highly concen-
trated. In particular, in Estonia the level of concentration is very
high according to the HHI Index. This is mainly due to the domi-
2The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index measures the concentration of the banking market based
on the sum of squared market shares of individual banks. The upper value of this index is 10000
in the case of a monopolist and tends to be zero in a case of a large number of firms with very
small market shares. Values higher than 1800 indicate that markets are fairly concentrated.
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nant role of the Swedish-owned Hansabank, which owns more than
70 percent of total banking sector assets.
3 The Theory of the Bank Lending
Channel
Due to importance of banks in the financial systems of the Baltic
countries and the high presence of foreign-owned banks the aim of
this paper is to analyze the emergence of a bank lending channel and
the influence of foreign-owned banks on the monetary policy trans-
mission mechanism in the Baltics.
The traditional mechanism through which monetary shocks are trans-
mitted to the real economy is the interest rate channel (Mishkin
(1996)). Central to this transmission channel is the change in loan
demand following an interest rate rise due to lower demand for in-
vestments. This finally depresses economic activity. The banking
sector is not explicitly modeled and it is assumed that the supply of
loans is not affected by interest rate changes. A reduction in the loan
growth rate is therefore only due to a lower demand for loans and not
due to reduced loan supply. The interest rate channel relies on the
Modigliani-Miller Theorem according to which banks are indifferent
at the margin between refinancing with the issuance of demand and
time deposits (e.g. certificates of deposit).3 A reduction of bank
reserves resulting from restrictive open market operations therefore
does not lead to a reduction in loan supply, since banks can easily
compensate the loss of reservable demand deposits through an in-
crease in nonreservable time deposits (Kishan and Opiela (2000)).
Demand deposits decrease, since the interest rate rise makes other
investments more profitable for customers. The replacement of de-
mand deposits by time deposits assumes that both are perfectly sub-
stitutable.
3The Modigliani-Miller Theorem states that a company’s investment decision is independent
of its capital structure (Modigliani and Miller (1958)).
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The theory of the bank lending channel depends on the failure of
this proposition and postulates that banks face a liquidity constraint
that forces them to reduce loan supply in response to a restrictive
monetary policy shock (Kashyap and Stein (2000)). The reason for
the existence of a bank lending channel is information asymmetries
between banks that issue and banks that buy time deposits. Since
these deposits are not insured, the information on the default risk of
the issuing banks becomes important and demand and time deposits
are no longer perfect substitutes. Banks therefore face a liquidity
constraint and have to reduce the supply of loans in response to
a restrictive monetary policy shock. The importance of informa-
tion asymmetries for bank lending is criticized by Romer and Romer
(1990)). They claim that banks can easily switch between reserv-
able and nonreservable deposits and therefore argue that the size of
the bank lending channel is rather limited. Empirical analyses of
the bank lending channel, however, suggest the opposite and find
evidence that the strength of the bank lending channel is inter alia
determined by the size, the liquidity and the capitalization of banks.
Kashyap and Stein (1995) and Kishan and Opiela (2000) argue that
bank size affects the reaction of banks to restrictive monetary shocks.
Since small banks encounter more asymmetric information problems
on the capital market than large banks and therefore may find it more
difficult to raise uninsured funds in response to monetary tightening,
larger banks are expected to react less strongly to monetary policy
shocks (Kashyap and Stein (1995)). However, not only the size of
the bank, but also the size of the borrowers matters. Since banks en-
counter greater information asymmetries when borrowers are small,
restrictive monetary shocks also have distributional effects among
customers. These asymmetries create a gap between the cost of in-
ternal and external financing for borrowers (Bernanke and Blinder
(1988)). A contractionary monetary policy shock can increase this
gap and therefore raise the costs for information-intensive borrow-
ers. Open market operations consequently reduce the loan supply of
banks by raising the costs of capital for bank-dependent borrowers
(Kishan and Opiela (2000)). This credit rationing particularly af-
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fects households and small firms that depend on banks as a source
of external finance, since they are informationally opaque and do
not have the opportunity to acquire external financing from capi-
tal markets like large companies (Berger, Klapper, and Udell (2001)
and Go¨rgens, Ruckriegel, and Seitz (2005)). However, even when
information is distributed symmetrically, capital markets would not
represent an alternative source of financing in the Baltic countries,
since they are fairly underdeveloped with a market capitalization well
below the levels of European bank-based financial systems (see Table
1).
Kashyap and Stein (2000) moreover argue that restrictive monetary
policy shocks reduce bank reserves and therefore force banks to re-
duce lending if they cannot switch to other forms of finance or eas-
ily liquidate assets other than loans. More liquid banks are hence
expected to react less strongly to changes in the monetary policy
indicator than less liquid banks (Kashyap and Stein (2000)).
Kishan and Opiela (2000) furthermore give empirical evidence that
the capitalization of banks significantly influences the lending behav-
ior of banks, since loans are subject to capital requirements like the
capital adequacy ratios of the Basel Accord. Banks operating near
or below this level consequently cannot expand lending without ad-
ditional equity. Since the market value of bank equity decreases in
response to a restrictive monetary impulse, banks have to reduce the
supply of loans in order to stick to the capital requirement. Since
banks with a high level of equity should have it easier to meet this re-
quirement, well capitalized banks are expected to react less strongly
to changes in the monetary policy indicator than poorly capitalized
banks (Kishan and Opiela (2000)). The decline in equity value fur-
thermore leads to a higher leverage position of banks (less risky as-
sets are backed with equity) which translates into higher risk premia
charged in the interbank market (Van den Heuvel (2002)). This fur-
ther increases the cost of refinancing and thus the strength of the
bank lending channel.
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Another reason for the existence of a bank lending channel arises from
the structure of the banking sector. According to Kamin, Turner,
and Van’t dack (1998), factors that influence the degree of response
to monetary policy shocks are not only bank characteristics, but also
the level of competition within the banking sector. When the level
of competition is high, changes in the cost of funds are very likely
to have a fast impact on the quantity and the rates of loans and
deposits, whereas in a banking sector with a low level of competition
borrowers are subject to oligopolistic pricing behavior. Loan rates
are therefore expected to respond less strongly to changes of the mon-
etary policy indicator (Kamin, Turner, and Van’t dack (1998)).
To summarize, the existence of the bank lending channel in the Baltic
depends inter alia on the following determinants: Firstly, bank cap-
italization and liquidity influence the pass through of monetary pol-
icy impulses to the real economy. More liquid and better capitalized
banks react less strongly to a restrictive monetary policy impulse
than less liquid and poorly capitalized banks. Secondly, the abil-
ity and sources of refinancing affect the liquidity position of banks
and therefore the availability of loans after a restrictive shock. Refi-
nancing via capital markets, interbank loans or internal markets of
banking corporations depends furthermore on underlying informa-
tional frictions. Since large banks face less informational asymme-
tries than small banks, the costs of funding are expected to be lower
for large banks. The impact of monetary policy shocks on bank loan
aggregates is thus expected to be smaller for large banks than for
small banks. The refinancing costs can also be influenced by the
market structure of the banking sector, which is the third factor that
contributes to the existence of a bank lending channel. In banking
markets with a low level of competition, loan supply and/or loan
interest rates react less strongly to changes in refinancing costs re-
ducing the strength of the bank lending channel.
In part 5, these three hypotheses are tested in order to find out if
banks play a particular role in the monetary transmission mechanism
in the Baltics. Particular attention is thereby put on the distinctive
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features that influence this mechanism. These are (I) the foreign
exchange rate regime, (II) the dominance of foreign-owned banks
and (III) the structural characteristics of the banking market in the
Baltics.
4 Distinctive Features of the Monetary
Transmission Mechanism in the Baltics
4.1 The Foreign Exchange Regime
The first important feature of the Baltic countries lies in the nature
of the monetary policy regime. Since all Baltic States have adopted
a currency board arrangement monetary policy is determined by the
central bank in the anchor country. Such an exchange rate regime is
characterized by a fixed exchange rate, the convertibility rule, which
restricts base money supply to foreign reserves, and a strong legal
commitment to maintain the arrangement in the long-term. The
most important monetary policy instruments of such a regime are
the unlimited foreign exchange window and the reserve requirement.
Since the monetary base in countries with currency board arrange-
ments is limited by the existing stock of foreign currency reserves,
the exchange window is used by banks in these countries to exchange
foreign reserves for domestic currency coins and banknotes. The im-
portance of foreign reserves as liquidity buffer becomes clear by the
large amount of net foreign liabilities, which amounted to about 23
percent in Estonia and 19 percent of GDP in Latvia at the end of
2004 (Backe and Zumar (2005)).
Closer integration with foreign markets, the use of foreign reserves
as a liquidity buffer and a fixed exchange rate regime have there-
fore improved the preconditions for foreign interest rate signals to
better pass through to the domestic financial sector (Lepik and Tors
(2002)). In particular, interest rate changes in the anchor currency
are expected to have a significant impact on domestic loans. The
transmission of foreign interest rate changes is intensified by the
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large share of foreign interest rate linked loans. Over half of real
sector loans are granted under a floating interest rate linked to the
euro interest rate in Latvia (Bitans, Stikuts, and Tillers (2003)) and
Estonia (Kaasik, Kattai, Randveer, and Sepp (2003)).
4.2 Foreign Ownership of Banks
The privatization of the banking sector and the liberalization of cap-
ital flows have resulted in large inflows of foreign direct investment in
the banking sector of the Baltic countries (Adahl (2002)). Due to the
process of consolidation in the late nineties and the increased M&A
activity by foreign banks the Baltic banking markets are now highly
concentrated and mainly foreign-owned. The ownership structure re-
veals a high stake among European banks and a high involvement of
Scandinavian banks, in particular from Sweden.4 Whereas in Latvia
and Lithuania most of the foreign banks are subsidiaries, main foreign
branches were established by German and Swedish banks in Estonia.5
The presence of foreign banks in the banking sector of the Baltic
countries has different implications for the bank lending channel.
Better risk evaluation procedures introduced by foreign banks work
in favor of this channel. Efficient risk management enables banks to
better evaluate the creditworthiness of borrowers. This is due to a
better assessment of changes in a borrower’s debt service ability and
the faster adjustment of credit volumes. At first glance, this reduces
the strength of the bank lending channel resulting from the decrease
in information asymmetries. But in reliance to the equity position of
a bank, especially during operating near the margin, riskier projects
can be identified and rationed more easily. Economically inefficient
rationing can therefore be reduced. The response of foreign-owned
banks to monetary policy actions of the Baltic central banks is likely
to be limited and overshadowed by monetary policy decision in the
4Ownership information of banks has been taken from the homepages of the banks, the central
banks and local banking associations in these countries.
5This seems noteworthy since there is an important legal distinction between subsidiaries and
branches. Branches form an integral part of a legal banking entity, a subsidiary is a separate legal
entity with capital of its own and therefore more sensitive to national monetary policy actions.
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host countries of the foreign investor (Bitans, Stikuts, and Tillers
(2003)). This reduces the impact of domestic interest rate changes
on the loan portfolio of Baltic banks, but implies a stronger reaction
to foreign interest rate changes.
Domestic subsidiaries of foreign banks are furthermore part of an
internal capital market. Foreign parent banks might use these mar-
kets to allocate mostly book capital to subsidiaries to support them
with tier 1 and 2 capital as well as liquidity (De Haas and Naaborg
(2005)). This reduces the strength of the bank lending channel, since
subsidiary banks can make use of the internal capital allocation to
cover policy induced liquidity drains. Parent banks furthermore use
internal capital markets to set risk-weighted asset limits which cor-
respond to certain credit growth or market share targets set by the
parent bank. It can therefore be assumed that subsidiaries credit
growth is mainly determined by the consolidated group amount of
capital (De Haas and Naaborg (2005)).6 The euro money market is
for these reasons expected to have a larger impact on the loan ag-
gregates of the Baltic banks than the domestic money market rate.7
4.3 Structural Characteristics of the Baltic
Banking Market
The monetary transmission mechanism is also influenced by the strength
and the size of the banks, the level of competition and the ownership
structure of banks (see part 3). The strength of a bank can be as-
sessed by the capitalization and the liquidity. Most of the banks in
the Baltics have capital ratios (equity capital ratio) well above the 10
percent level. In 2004, the average capital ratio was 12.45 percent in
Estonia and about 15 percent in Latvia and in Lithuania. In the case
of liquidity, banks with a high average liquidity ratio defined as the
6Tier 1 (shareholder’s equity and retained earnings) and tier 2 (hybrid financing instruments)
capital represent specific classes of equity or equity like capital for supervisory capital adequacy
requirements to hold a certain amount of equity capital for risky assets.
7It has to be noted that Sweden has not adopted the euro, but still exchange rates and
interest rates movements are very close not to say almost the same as can be seen in the euro
area. Therefore, a further distinction did not appeal to bring more information.
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ratio of liquid assets (e.g. cash, interbank deposits and securities) to
total bank assets are located in Latvia (21.29 percent in 2004) and
Lithuania (24.81 percent in 2004). In Estonia, this ratio is signifi-
cantly lower (1.15 percent in 2004). The impact of monetary policy
shocks on the loan growth rate is therefore expected to be stronger
in Estonia than in Latvia and Lithuania. Bank size also affects the
monetary transmission mechanism. The average bank size measured
by the ratio of bank assets to total banking sector assets is 11.11
percent in Lithuania and 4.6 percent in Latvia (in 2004). In Estonia,
huge differences exist in the size of the banks, since the largest bank
holds 73.67 percent and the smallest 0.11 percent of the total bank-
ing assets. The measure of average bank size alone might therefore
be misleading.
Table 3: Banking Market Characteristics
Small Large Foreign-
Owned
Domestic-
Owned
Liquidity EST 0.8% EST 1.9% EST 1.2% EST 0.8%
LIT 27.9% LIT 19.0% LIT 21.7% LIT 28.6%
LAT 22.2% LAT 15.9% LAT 22.4% LAT 19.0%
Capitalization EST 14.1% EST 11.1% EST 12.5% EST n.a.
LIT 15.7% LIT 11.1% LIT 14.4% LIT 15.5%
LAT 14.5% LAT 21.1% LAT 16.1% LAT 16.4%
Source: International Financial Statistics (2005), Allen, Bartillo, and
Kowalewski (2005) and EBRD (various issues). * Data from 2003, **
Data from 1998.
For this reason, we distinguished into small and large as well as
foreign and domestic-owned banks and analyzed the capital and liq-
uidity position of these banks in Table 3. In Estonia, large (mostly
foreign-owned) banks (on average 1.9 percent in 2004) have a higher
liquidity ratio than small banks (on average 0.8 percent in 2004).
This implies a stronger reaction of small banks to restrictive mon-
etary policy shocks. A different picture can be seen in Latvia and
Lithuania. In these countries, smaller (mostly domestic-owned) banks
are on average more liquid than large (mostly foreign-owned) banks.
Large banks are therefore expected to be more sensitive to mone-
tary policy shifts in Latvia and Lithuania. Regarding capitalization,
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small and large banks are both well capitalized with average capital
ratios well above 10 percent. In Latvia and Lithuania, small banks
are again on average better capitalized than large banks, whereas
in Estonia larger banks are better capitalized than smaller banks.
Since small banks are on average more liquid and well capitalized
than large banks, the effect of differences in bank size on the loan
supply might be counter-balanced by liquidity and capitalization ef-
fects and therefore be indeterminate. With regard to the owner-
ship structure, foreign-owned banks are more poorly capitalized than
domestic-owned banks. This indicates a weaker effect of monetary
policy impulses on smaller (domestic-owned) banks than on large
(foreign-owned) banks.
The level of competition within the banking sector also represents
an important factor influencing the monetary transmission process.
The banking sectors in Estonia and Lithuania are more concentrated
according to the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (see Table 2) than in
Latvia. This should result in a weaker reaction of bank lending to
a monetary policy impulse in Estonia and Latvia and a stronger
reaction of banks in Lithuania as a consequence of the aforementioned
characteristics.
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 The Data
Data on annual nominal GDP and the monetary policy indicator
come from International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF. As
monetary policy indicator, we used the 3-month EURIBOR as the
reference rate for the euro money market and the respective 3-month
money market rates for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.8 The obser-
8The money market rate in Estonia is 3-month Tallin Interbank Offered rate (TIBOR), in
Latvia the 3-month Riga Interbank Offered Rate (RIGIBOR) and in Lithuania the 3-month
Vilnius Interbank Offered Rate (VILIBOR).
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vations start in 1997 and end in 2004.
Data on bank lending and bank characteristics have been taken from
the BankScope database of Bureau van Dijk. This database contains
annual information on bank balance sheet position as well as profit
and loss data for 36 commercial banks in the Baltic region for the
period between 1997 and 2004. Most of these banks are located in
Latvia followed by Lithuania and Estonia. The balance sheet po-
sitions are reported either in local currency or in US dollars. To
prevent that exchange rate fluctuations of the local currency against
the dollar reduce the comparability of balance sheet positions among
banks in different countries and years, we used the positions reported
in local currency to calculate the loan growth rate, the bank size, liq-
uidity as well as the capitalization ratio. Instead of unconsolidated
balance sheets, we furthermore used consolidated balance sheets in
order to assess the financial constraints and informational asymme-
tries of a bank.
A problem with BankScope data in general is that small banks are
underrepresented which might lead to biased regression results. An-
other problem is that BankScope only contains data on foreign sub-
sidiary banks and not on branches of foreign banks. This is however
not a problem for our analysis, since branches are an integral part
of a larger bank. Bank balance sheet data therefore do not neces-
sarily reflect the business of foreign branches, but might be rather
the result of the internal capital policy. The BankScope dataset fur-
thermore covers more than 90 percent of total banking sector assets
and is hence reasonably representative of the banking sectors in the
Baltics.
5.2 The Model
The empirical analysis of the bank lending channel in the Baltics is
based on an approach introduced by Kashyap and Stein (1995) and
Kashyap and Stein (2000). This approach has frequently been used to
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analyze the existence of a bank lending channel in the eurozone and
tests if the reaction of banks to changes in refinancing costs depends
on the size, the liquidity and the capitalization of banks.9 This has
usually been done by introducing interaction terms between interest
rates and bank discriminatory variables. Beside these variables the
nominal loan growth rate is also regressed on the log of the nominal
GDP to control for demand-side effects on loan growth. Since the
non-stationarity of the time-series cannot be dismissed a priori and
unit root tests do not seem to be appropriate due to the short sample
period, we took the first difference of the log of the nominal loan
stock, the monetary policy indicator and the log of nominal GDP.
Based on Kashyap and Stein (1995) the model is therefore formulated
according to the following general regression equation:10
∆(logLit) = αi+
l∑
j=0
βj(log Yit)+
l∑
j=0
γ1xi,t−1+
l∑
j=0
γ2(xi,t−1∗∆MMt−j)+it
(1)
where i = 1,...N and t = 1,...T and where N denotes the number
of banks and l the number of lags. ∆(logL) is the nominal loan
growth rate in year, MM the monetary policy indicator, ∆(log Y )
the nominal GDP growth rate and αi a bank-specific intercept to
control for unobserved time-invariant differences between each cross-
section unit. Since we estimate equation (1) with a coefficient for
the monetary policy indicator (γ1) and the GDP growth rate (βj),
the demand for loans is assumed to be homogeneous among coun-
tries with respect to income and interest rate elasticity. The bank
characteristic variables are captured by xit and have been defined
9Studies that have analyzed the strength of a bank lending channel in the eurozone countries
are De Haan (2001), Gambacorta (2001), Ehrmann, Gambacorta, and Martinez-Pages (2001)
and Loupias, Savignac, and Sevestre (2001).
10This equation slightly deviates from the equation introduced by Kashyap and Stein (1995)
to analyze the existence of a credit channel in that it contains the growth rate of nominal GDP
instead of the growth rate of real GDP and the rate of inflation. We used this specification in order
to reduce the number of parameters to be estimated due to the small numbers of observations
available.
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according to Ehrmann, Gambacorta, and Martinez-Pages (2001)) in
the following way:
Sizeit = logAit − 1/N
∑
logAit (2)
Liqit = Lit − 1/T
∑
(1/N
∑
Lit/Ait) (3)
Capit = Cit − 1/T
∑
(1/N
∑
Cit/Ait) (4)
Bank size (Size) is measured as the log of total assets of bank i in
year t, liquidity (Liq) as the ratio of liquid assets L to total bank as-
sets and capitalization (Cap) as the ratio of capital C to total bank
assets. This generates variables that add up to zero over all obser-
vations and allows us to interpret the coefficient of the monetary
policy indicator (γ1) directly as the average measure of the mone-
tary policy effect on the loan growth rate (Ehrmann, Gambacorta,
and Martinez-Pages (2001)). The normalization of the size variable
furthermore eliminates general trends in the financial sector of the
Baltics, as for example, the general deepening of the financial sector.
The specification of liquidity and capitalization moreover removes
the overall average across banks and over time from each observation.
This might be relevant, since general trends of decreasing liquidity
and capitalization might affect the transmission of monetary policy
shocks in the Baltics.
The bank characteristic variables are used together in single regres-
sions, since including them separately in a model is likely to gener-
ate an omitted variable bias, when the variables are related to each
other. The coefficient of these variables is significant if the relation-
ship between bank lending and the bank discriminatory variables
is linear. The bank characteristics are furthermore interacted with
the monetary policy indicator to find out if monetary shocks have
distributional effects on the banking sector in the Baltics. The as-
sumption is that small, less liquid and poorly capitalized banks react
more strongly to interest rate changes. This is equivalent with a sig-
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nificant positive coefficient of the interaction terms and means that
banks with these characteristics reduce their loan growth rate more
strongly in response to a restrictive monetary shock than large, liquid
and well capitalized banks.
5.3 Estimation Method
Because of the lack of long time-series data the degree of financial
integration is estimated only for the group and not for each country
separately. This panel approach has the advantage that informa-
tion from cross-sectional and time-series data is used to estimate
the relationship between credit growth and the bank characteristic
variables. To control for autocorrelation of the residuals, we intro-
duce a first-order autoregressive term instead of a lagged dependent
variable. That makes it possible to estimate equation (1) with Or-
dinary Least Squares (OLS) instead of the Generalized Methods of
Moments (GMM).11 Although the latter is the standard estimator in
analyzing the existence of a credit channel (see, for instance, De Haan
(2001), Gambacorta (2001), Ehrmann, Gambacorta, and Martinez-
Pages (2001) and Loupias, Savignac, and Sevestre (2001)), the small
number of cross-section units and years makes OLS the appropriate
estimator for our sample.
To estimate equation (1), we proceed as follows. In the first step,
we regress the nominal loan growth rate on the current and the first
lag of the nominal GDP growth rate, as well as the contemporane-
ous and the first lag of the money market rate. If the first lags of
these variables turn out to be insignificant and if Wald tests do not
reject the hypothesis that insignificant coefficients are jointly equal
to zero, we drop the insignificant variables and re-estimated equation
(1) without the insignificant lags. To allow for heterogeneity among
banks and to test for a linear relationship between bank charac-
11The presence of a lagged dependent variable among the regressors to control for autocor-
relation in a regression with individual effects (αi) leads to the correlation of a right-hand side
regressor with the error term. In this case, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation would be
biased and inconsistent and the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) the better estimation
method. See Baltagi (2001) for a detailed and complete analysis of panel data estimation.
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teristics and loan growth, the size, liquidity and the capitalization
of banks are introduced as additional explanatory variables. Since
these variables depend on the loan growth rate, the first lag of these
variables is used as regressor instead of the contemporaneous variable
to prevent a simultaneity bias. In the second step, we subsequently
add interaction terms between the monetary policy indicator and
the bank characteristic variables to find out if interest rate changes
have a different impact on the loan growth rate depending on the
size, the liquidity and the capitalization of the bank.12 The existence
of asymmetries across banks in their reaction to a monetary policy
tightening can then be assessed from the sign of the interaction co-
efficients. Time dummy variables were used to control for structural
breaks that might have been caused, for example, by changes in the
foreign exchange rate regime. These dummies however turned out to
be insignificant and were consequently dropped from all regressions.
5.4 Estimation Results with Interaction Terms
The results of these regressions are presented in Table 4 on page 23
for the standard regression model with the domestic and European
monetary policy indicator.13 Since the lags of the GDP growth rate
and the domestic money market rate turn out to be (jointly) insignif-
icant in all regressions, the model is re-estimated without lags. The
R2 of these regressions lies between 0.22 and 0.25. This is relatively
low, but in line with other studies on the bank lending channel in
Central and Eastern Europe (Schmitz (2003)). The low fit of the
model can partly be explained by the domestic monetary policy in-
dicator, which has a positive sign and turned out to be insignificant
in all regressions. This indicates that the growth rate of loans is not
determined by the domestic monetary policy indicator. This result
might be explained by the large proportion of foreign-currency and
floating rate loans, whose interest rate depends upon an international
reference rate. Another explanation for the insignificance of the do-
12The influence of size, liquidity and bank capitalization on the effect of an interest rate change
on the loan growth rate is hereafter called size, liquidity and capitalization effect.
13The intercept dummies of these regressions and the following regressions have not been
reported, but are available from the authors on request.
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mestic money market rate as determinant of domestic loan growth is
the large number of foreign-owned banks, which have easier access to
the international capital market and use internal capital markets to
refinance themselves. The choice of the exchange rate regime is a fur-
ther explanation for the insignificance of the domestic money market
rate in the standard regression model. Since all Baltic countries have
pegged their currency to the euro in a currency board arrangement,
this might indicate that the euro money market rate is likely to be a
better determinant for the loan growth rate in these countries. This
is also suggested by the large amount of debt that is denominated in
euro and the large proportion of loans whose interest rate is pegged
to a euro reference rate.
The nominal GDP growth rate conversely enters the regression equa-
tion with the expected positive sign and is highly significant in all
regressions. The coefficient of this variable is relatively stable and
fluctuates (with exception of the regression with the capitalization
interaction term) around 4, which indicates that a one percentage
point increase in the nominal GDP growth rate leads on average to
a 4 percentage point increase in the nominal growth rate of loans.
The bank characterizing variables are also significant and seem to be
linearly related to the nominal loan growth rate. Since the bank char-
acteristics have been normalized, these coefficients give the impact
of monetary policy on bank lending for the average characteristic in
the sample and are hard to be interpreted. The interpretation of
these variables hence concentrates only on the sign of the respective
coefficient for the bank size, liquidity and capitalization ratio. The
negative sign of the bank size variable indicates that the loan growth
rate is on average lower for large banks. This result is also found
by Schmitz (2003) for central and eastern European countries. An
explanation for this result is that smaller banks lend more aggres-
sively to private borrowers in order to increase their market share.
Larger banks are conversely more risk-prone due to a larger stock of
non-performing loans inherited from the past when most large banks
were state-owned. They hence have on average a lower loan growth
rate than smaller banks. The coefficient of the liquidity ratio also
22
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has a negative sign and points out that more liquid banks seem to
have on average lower loan growth rates than less liquid banks. This
can be explained by the fact that banks with a larger amount of liq-
uid assets tend to build up a high liquidity buffer and remain very
cautious in their lending activities maybe due to a former large share
of accumulated non-performing loans. Since the capital adequacy ra-
tio in the Baltic banking sector remained fairly high in recent years,
less liquid banks furthermore might have lent more aggressively to
increase their market share. The sign of the capitalization ratio is, in
contrast, positive. This indicates that better capitalized banks have
on average higher loan growth rates than poorly capitalized banks.
In order to find out if monetary shocks have distributional effects on
the banks in the Baltic region the domestic monetary policy indica-
tor is subsequently made to interact with the discriminatory bank
variables. The results of these regressions are presented in column 2
to 4 of Table 4. The regressions indicate that bank size and liquidity
do not significantly influence the response of banks to changes in the
nominal interest rate. This might indicate that the discriminatory
bank variables are not good proxies for the information asymmetries
of banks or that there is no bank lending channel in the Baltics.
Another explanation for the insignificance of the interaction terms is
that the lending decision of banks in the Baltics does not depend on
the domestic monetary policy indicator. Bank characteristics thus
cannot have asymmetric effects among banks, when made to inter-
act with the domestic money market rate.
To test if the European monetary policy indicator determines the
loan growth rate in the Baltics, we substituted the European 3-
month money market for the domestic money market rate and re-
estimate equation (1). To account for serial correlation of the resid-
uals, we again introduce a first-order autoregressive term and used
bank-specific dummy variables to take time-invariant differences be-
tween each cross-section unit into consideration. Since the lags of the
GDP growth rate and the money market rate turn out to be (jointly)
insignificant in all regressions, the model is re-estimated without lags.
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The results of these regressions are presented in Table 5 on page 26.
The euro money market rate enters the regression equation signifi-
cantly and with the expected negative sign. According to our esti-
mates, a one percentage change in the European money market rate
reduces the growth rate of nominal loans on average between 12 and
20 percent. Since the euro money market is significant, the R2 signif-
icantly increases and reaches values of up to 0.50. The coefficient for
the growth rate of nominal GDP is also highly significant and enters
the regression equation with an expected positive sign. As for the
model with the domestic money market rate, the coefficient is rela-
tively stable and fluctuates (with exception of the regression with the
capitalization interaction term) around 4. The bank characteristic
variables are also highly significant and enter the regression equation
with the same sign as in the regression for the domestic monetary
policy indicator. To analyze if banks reduce their loan supply in re-
sponse to a monetary tightening, the European money market rate is
subsequently interacted with bank size, liquidity and capitalization.
The results of these regressions are presented in columns 6 to 8 of
Table 5. The interaction terms turned out to be highly significant
and further improved the fit of the regression. The signs of these
coefficients can now be used to assess the existence of asymmetries
across banks in their reaction to a monetary policy tightening. The
positive coefficient on the interaction of the monetary policy indi-
cator and bank size means that smaller banks react more strongly
to changes in the interest rate. Small banks hence encounter more
asymmetric information problems on the capital market than large
banks and therefore may find it more difficult to raise uninsured funds
in response to a monetary tightening (Kashyap and Stein (1995)).
The positive sign of the interaction variable of the European money
market rate with bank liquidity furthermore suggests that the degree
of liquidity impacts the loan supply and that less liquid banks react
more strongly to a change in the monetary policy indicator than more
liquid banks. The underlying reason is that banks with more liquid
balance sheets can use their liquidity reserves to maintain their loan
25
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portfolio and as such are less affected by a monetary policy tighten-
ing (Kashyap and Stein (1995)). The coefficient of the single inter-
action term of the monetary policy indicator and the capitalization
ratio is, in contrast, to the other interaction coefficients, negative.
This indicates that better capitalized banks react more strongly to a
monetary tightening than poorly capitalized banks. This result con-
tradicts our expectations. Since well capitalized banks should find it
easier to raise time deposits, the effect of an interest rate change on
the loan supply is expected to be larger for poorly capitalized banks
(Kishan and Opiela (2000)).
Due to the potential interrelations between size, liquidity and cap-
italization, we run a regression with all interaction terms together
to test if omitted variables have biased the regression with only one
interaction term. The result of this regression is presented in col-
umn 9 of Table 5. The variation that is explained by this model is
higher than in the regression with only one interaction term. This
indicates that the reaction of banks to changes in interest rates does
not depend on single bank characteristics, but rather on a combina-
tion of these characteristics and that omitted variables might have
biased the regression results in the regression with only one inter-
action term. To test this hypothesis, we made the money market
rate interact with the size and the liquidity variable according to
Ehrmann, Gambacorta, and Martinez-Pages (2001). The basic idea
is that the relief from additional liquidity is larger for smaller banks
(Kashyap and Stein (1995)). The result of the standard regression
model with a double interaction term is presented in column 10 of
Table 5. Since the single interaction terms for size and liquidity are
both highly significant, the omitted variables bias cannot come from
liquidity. The double interaction term also turned out to be highly
significant. The negative coefficient moreover indicates that the liq-
uidity effect is felt more strongly by the smaller banks in the sample.
Because the interaction term of size and the money market rate is
significant in the last regression, the omitted variable bias can only
come from the capitalization ratio. This is confirmed by the regres-
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sion of the standard model with single and double interaction terms
for size and capitalization (see column 11 of Table 5). Since the in-
teraction term of size with the monetary policy indicator turned out
to be insignificant, capitalization seems to be the omitted variable.
The double interaction term allows us to further analyze the rela-
tionship between size and capitalization. This term turned out to
be significant. The positive coefficient of the double interaction term
moreover indicates that the negative coefficient of the interaction
term between capitalization and the money market rate is mainly
driven by the smaller banks in the sample.
To summarize, the results indicate that the loan growth rate is not
determined by the domestic money market rate, but rather by the
European monetary policy indicator. Bank size furthermore does
not significantly influence the lending behavior of banks. This might
be due to the fact that liquidity and capitalization have counter-
balancing effects, since interest rate changes are, on the one hand, less
strongly felt by small and liquid banks. On the other hand, however,
small and well capitalized banks react more strongly to monetary
policy shocks. Therefore, the effect of an interest rate change on
small and liquid, but highly capitalized banks is indeterminate and
the coefficient of size insignificant. The regression results furthermore
suggest that distributional monetary policy effects are mainly caused
by differences in liquidity. This result is also found by Juks (2004)
for Estonia.
5.5 Estimation Results with Foreign Ownership
Dummy Variables
Since a large number of banks in the Baltics are owned by multina-
tional banks, which make it easier for domestic banks to re-finance
themselves in the international capital market, the next step of the
empirical analysis is to find out if foreign banks react differently to
changes in the monetary policy indicator than domestic banks. This
is done by introducing an ownership dummy variable, which takes
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a value of 1 in every year in which a bank is at majority owned by
a foreign bank and a value of 0 in all other years.14 The coefficient
is expected to be positive, since foreign banks are assumed to react
less strongly to changes of the interest rate because of the possibil-
ity to refinance themselves over the internal capital market at lower
costs. Instead of estimating the standard model with interaction
terms between the bank characteristic variables and the monetary
policy indicator, in this section we combine the monetary policy in-
dicator with the ownership dummy. To account for serial correlation
of the residuals, we furthermore introduce an autoregressive term and
use bank-specific dummy variables to take time-invariant differences
between each cross-section unit into consideration. Since the lags
of the GDP growth rate and the money market rate turned out to
be (jointly) insignificant in all regressions, the model is re-estimated
without lags. The regression results are presented in Table 6 on page
30. The lower adjusted R2 for the model with the European interest
rates indicates that the interaction terms of the bank discrimina-
tory variables and the monetary policy indicator have significantly
contributed to a better fit of the standard model. As in the ear-
lier regressions the domestic money market rate did not turn out
to be significant. The European monetary policy indicator on the
contrary enters the regression equation significantly and with the ex-
pected negative sign.
The GDP growth rate is also significant in all regressions including an
ownership dummy variable. The coefficient is positive and fluctuates
around 4. This indicates that the size value of the coefficient for the
growth rate does not depend on the econometric specification and is
therefore rather robust. The bank characterizing variables are also
highly significant (except the size variable in the standard model with
the domestic interest rate). The sign of these coefficients thus prove
to be robust to the econometric specification as well, since the bank
size and the liquidity variable have still a negative and the capital-
ization variable still a positive sign. The ownership dummies in the
14Banks that were owned by foreign private investors were not labelled as foreign-owned banks,
since these banks do not have access to an internal capital market.
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Table 6: Results for the Standard Regression Model with an Ownership Dummy
Variable
Dependent Variable: Nominal
Loan Growth Rate
12 13
Domestic MM Rate 1.55
(3.64)
Euro MM Rate -20.67***
(4.40)
GDP Growth Rate 3.99** 4.37***
(1.65) (1.26)
Size(-1) -36.82 -47.69**
(22.43) (19.59)
Liquidity(-1) -1.04*** -1.00***
(0.39) (0.33)
Capitalization(-1) 1.83*** 2.12***
(0.33) (0.29)
Domestic MM Rate*Ownership 1.65
(5.63)
Euro MM Rate*Ownership 13.93*
(7.54)
Observations 159 167
Adjusted R-squared 0.22 0.34
Note: ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, stan-
dard errors in parenthesis. The bank-specific intercepts have not been
reported, but are available from the authors at request.
domestic money market rate regression appeared to be insignificant.
Because the domestic monetary policy indicator was not significant
in the previous regressions at all, this result is not surprising. In the
regression with the European monetary policy indicator, the owner-
ship dummy conversely turned out to be significant at the 10 percent
level and has the expected positive sign. Although the evidence is
rather weak, this result might indicate that the foreign banks in this
region use internal capital markets to refinance themselves at lower
costs than domestic-owned banks.
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6 Summary and Conclusions
With the accession to the EU in March 2004 Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania will soon join the EMU and adopt the euro as their single
currency. Therefore the transmission process of monetary shocks in
these countries is of interest not only for national central bankers,
but also for the ECB. So far research has however mostly concen-
trated on the transmission mechanism in countries that are already
member of the EMU. The intention of this paper was to fill this gap
and to analyze the existence of a bank lending channel of monetary
transmission in the Baltic States.
The Baltic States represent a rather homogenous group among the
new member states owing to an almost identical foreign exchange
system, the currency board arrangement pegged to the euro. Their
financial systems evolved out of the non-existence under socialist her-
itage into an almost fully fledged bank-based financial system with
a remarkable large share of foreign owned banks. Due to the pro-
cess of catching-up of the real economy and due to underdeveloped
capital markets bank loans have turned out to be the main source of
finance for household and nonfinancial corporations. In this context,
the presented study has focused on one of the channels of monetary
transmission, namely the bank lending channel. This transmission
channel stresses the role of asymmetric information that forces banks
to reduce the supply of loans in response to a restrictive monetary
policy shock. Bank characteristics and the structure of the banking
sector influence the extent to which loan supply has to be reduced
and therefore determine the strength of the bank lending channel.
According to theory, larger, better capitalized and more liquid banks
react less strongly to restrictive monetary impulses as well as banks
in oligopolistic markets. Foreign banks also seem to play a major
role in the transmission of monetary shocks due to the possibility to
use internal capital markets and better access to international capital
markets.
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Estimations show that changes of domestic monetary policy rates do
not significantly influence the lending behavior of banks. The domes-
tic money market indicator was insignificant, while the euro money
market rate turned out to be highly significant in all regressions.
This can be attributed to the large share of foreign currency denomi-
nated loans mostly with a floating foreign interest rate commitment.
Foreign ownership and the use of internal capital markets also help
to explain the large foreign indebtedness of the banking sector. A
large proportion of these foreign currency loans is denominated in
euro. This together with the peg to the euro suggests that the euro
money market rate is likely to be a better determinant of the loan
growth rate in the Baltics.
The results furthermore indicate that bank size does not significantly
influence the lending behavior of banks. This might be due to the
fact that liquidity and capitalization have counter-balancing effects,
since interest rate changes are, on the one hand, less strongly felt
by small and liquid banks. On the other hand, however, small and
well capitalized banks react more strongly to monetary policy shocks.
Therefore, the effect of an interest rate change on small and liquid,
but highly capitalized banks is indeterminate and the coefficient of
size insignificant. The regression results moreover suggest that dis-
tributional monetary policy effects are mainly caused by differences
in liquidity.
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